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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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congressional control over such activities. The Hoover Commission Task Force outlined the areas of congressional interest as follows:

1. Conduct comprehensive studies of foreign intelligence activities of the United States;
2. Look for overlapping and duplication;
3. Determine whether expenditures are within budget authorizations and in keeping with the expressed intent of Congress; and
4. Consider whether any of the activities are in conflict with the foreign policy aims and programs of the United States.

With these tools the Congress would reassume its constitutional authority and in no way jeopardize intelligence activities.

One of the principal arguments advanced against my resolution is that no other nation permits legislative control of its intelligence activities. Such system is practical for the Soviet dictatorship and even for Great Britain where the administration is a part of and responsible to Parliament. Under our Constitution, however, with delicate system of check and balances, dislocations as in the case of CIA cannot be tolerated.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully urge that this committee do favorably report House Concurrent Resolution 3 for action by the House.

*gdc*  
SECURITY RISKS

(Mr. SNYDER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Speaker, on 2 successive days last week articles appeared in Chicago's American newspaper in regard to the State Department's move to oust Otto Otepka, Chief of the Evaluation Division of the Department's Office of Security.

These articles follow:

[From Chicago's American, Oct. 2, 1963]

## THE ALLEN-SCOTT REPORT: BITTER ROW ON SECURITY RISKS

WASHINGTON.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has pried open a real can of worms in its investigation of the State Department's move to discredit and oust Otto Otepka, 48, Chief of the Evaluation Division in the Department's Office of Security.

In digging into the Otepka case, the Senate probbers have uncovered a backstage effort within the State Department to clear the way for a number of former security risks, including Alger Hiss, to worm their way back onto the Government's payroll as either employees or consultants.

According to the sworn testimony before the subcommittee, one of the central figures in this maneuvering is Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs.

## ADVISORY APPOINTMENTS

Cleveland touched off the bitter security row within the Department by appointing a number of persons with questionable security backgrounds to an advisory committee to study the staffing of Americans on international organizations.

According to the testimony, Cleveland also made inquiries as to whether it would be possible to bring Hiss, a former State Department official convicted of perjury to conceal espionage, back into the Department.

Otepka was so shocked over Cleveland's activities that he sent a series of blistering reports to his superiors, including one that was routed through channels to McGeorge Bundy, the President's Chief White House Adviser on Foreign Policy.

One of these reports included a detailed box score of persons with questionable security background whom Cleveland had either brought into the Department or was

in the process of trying to obtain job clearance for.

When the State Department's daisy chain tipped off Cleveland that he was being watched, he retaliated swiftly by having John F. Reilly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, place Otepka under surveillance. This was arranged through the office of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, a personal friend of Reilly.

Otepka was then removed from security operations. His phone was bugged and he was placed under close observation after it was learned that Senate investigators had questioned him, under subpoena, about security risks in the Department.

Charges of misconduct, involving the alleged release of documents to the Senate Subcommittee, were filed against Otepka September 23 by John Ordway, Chief of the Personnel Operations Division.

According to the findings in a State Department investigative report, evidence was found that Otepka had furnished "a copy of classified memorandum concerning the processing of appointments of the advisory committee on international organization staffing to Mr. J. G. Sourwine, staff director of the Senate Subcommittee for Internal Security. This memorandum concerns the loyalty of employees or prospective employees of the Department within the meaning of the Presidential directives of March 13, 1948."

## INFORMATION ON SECURITY RISKS

The report also charged that Otepka was responsible "for the declassification of a document containing classified information addressed to McGeorge Bundy, the White House, and signed by William H. Bruback, Special Assistant Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department." This document contained information about security risks within the Department.

Otepka, a civil service and State Department officer for more than 20 years, has one of the most outstanding records in his field of work in the Government. He was responsible for sending Irving C. Scarbeck, a Foreign Service Officer, to jail for passing U.S. secrets to the Russians, and for investigating William Wieland in connection with the State Department's Cuban policy. In all his investigations, the records show he has bent over backwards in protecting the rights of individuals under his surveillance. The Senate Subcommittee now plans to give Otepka the same protection.

[From Chicago's American, Oct. 3, 1963]

## A PLOT TO BRING HISS BACK

We are almost beyond being surprised at any goings-on in the State Department, but we do find this one astonishing: There is a group in there that is working like mad to bring the convicted perjurer, Alger Hiss, back into the Department. And for this purpose, the group is trying to get one of the Department's chief security officers fired. The officer is Otto Otepka, Chief of the Evaluation Division. He is opposed to the return of Hiss and to the proposed hiring of several men of doubtful loyalty.

These strange facts were set out on our editorial page Wednesday in the Allen-Scott report, which said the revelations had been brought to light by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. A leader in the movement to get Otepka out of Hiss' way, according to testimony given to the Senate subcommittee, is Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs. Cleveland, according to testimony given before the Senate subcommittee, has been asking how it might be possible to get Hiss back on the payroll.

Hiss, you will remember, was convicted (and served a prison term) on charges of having perjured himself to cover up the fact that, while serving as an official of the State Department, he supplied Russia with U.S.

secrets. If Cleveland wants Hiss back, then obviously Cleveland should not be in the American State Department.

The Senate subcommittee should bring all phases of this peculiar situation to the country's attention. And in the meanwhile, it should not permit the firing of Otepka for thinking and acting like a loyal American.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is imperative that the Department of State advise the country forthwith as to whether or not there is any truth in the allegation that they are working to bring Alger Hiss back into the State Department. All America will want to know whether or not the charges in the above articles are correct—and if so, it is time that the Congress do something about it. If the statements are not true, the Congress and the American people deserve to know the facts.

## WHEAT SALE TO THE SOVIET UNION

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, last night's Washington Evening Star and this morning's New York Times carried stories saying that a wheat sale to the Soviet Union was all but concluded. I find this all a little astonishing and disturbing.

It is astonishing because the administration apparently after only a few days of trial balloons and calculated press releases, without any genuine public or congressional debate, is willing to do handstands to help relieve Khrushchev from the disastrous failures of Soviet agriculture. It is disturbing because nowhere have I found in the press reports a consistent statement of facts and figures that clearly spell out the factors that are involved in this deal. No one seems to know where this deal will lead. This fact raises a great many questions that must be settled before I, in my own mind, can support such a sale.

For instance, we are being told from many sides that the trade is in everybody's best interests—we dispose of our wheat surplus and get some needed gold and they get the wheat. But is it really that simple? Can we treat this trade deal as an isolated event in the cold war? Can we ignore the fact that the American people are spending more than \$55 billion this year to protect the free nations of the world from communistic aggression? Why are we so eager to get a paltry \$200 to \$300 million when we are at the same time spending 250 times that much to prevent the extension of communism? Why is the administration in such a hurry to conclude this deal?

As I understand the Latta amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1961, it declared the policy of Congress to be against the export or sale of any subsidized agricultural commodity to any nation that is not considered to be friendly. In the face of this clear and unmistakable pronouncement of congressional policy, it would seem that the President would undertake to consult officially with the Congress before con-

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sidering any transaction such as has been reported in the press. It seems imperative to me that under the circumstances, Congress should be consulted on such a basic and far-reaching change of policy.

Another question: So we sell \$250 million worth of wheat to the Soviets. That would really only represent a small dent in our surplus of over \$3½ billion. So we make a few fast gold bricks. Is it worth it? The consequences of this trade deal will not end when the wheat-laden ships leave our harbors. We will have taken Khrushchev off the hook at home and he will be able to say to the Soviet people, "Look what I've done. I've gotten our capitalistic enemies to subsidize communism." No one could help but applaud such an astute leader.

How can we ever again ask the free nations of the world not to trade with communistic nations?

There is much about this whole transaction to be thoroughly explored. It should be done deliberately. We should not act in haste. We should not impulsively turn to a new form of dollar diplomacy devoid of other considerations. The President should make known all of his reasons for such a deal and let the American people and the Congress evaluate them. The quick shuffle that we are getting causes me to be suspicious. We must not be too anxious for a few pieces of silver or gold.

Mr. Speaker, under leave previously granted, I am including a sampling of letters received from residents of Michigan's Sixth Congressional District with respect to this proposed transaction:

LANSING, MICH.,  
October 2, 1963.

HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN,  
New House Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Your last report (Sept. 30) did not contain anything about the administration's proposal to sell surplus wheat to the U.S.S.R., but when it was composed maybe the matter did not seem so possible.

There are many things in our Government that may be the discretion of the Executive Department and the Cabinet officers reporting to it, but is there no way that the ordinary citizen who tries to think the problems of our country through can express indignation at the inconsistency(ies) of the foreign policy? (except I mean by writing you). Why cannot we, the people, vote on selling vital supplies to our enemies?

I hope I am not inhuman and un-Christian in rebelling against such a proposal. I don't want anyone to go hungry—but when someone threatens to bury you (and Mr. K's threat was not an idle one) is it sensible or commercially wise to buy some of the spades, shovels and bulldozers for him? I would be willing to help pay the sums that will compose the profit or price of such sale if the commodity was kept from Russian life in even the same fashion that pigs and wheat were destroyed 30 years ago with less purpose.

Perhaps, everyone who agrees with me will not take the time to write you about their resentment of such folly on the part of the weather-vane foreign policymakers, but considering there was no use to write Michigan Senators my opinion of the treaty because of their committed pre-judgment, I couldn't let this opportunity pass to condemn such bad business and lack of patriotism.

Most sincerely,

FLINT, MICH.,  
October 2, 1963.

DEAR SIR: I was reading the newspaper this evening. In it was a item saying that this country may sell wheat to the Russians, if our President approves. Well sir, I can tell you now it made me pretty damn mad to think that the leaders of this country would even think of doing a thing like that.

Here we are with a national debt so high and our leaders in Washington asking for more. But the thing that tops it off is, the money they say is necessary to protect us from the very people we are going to sell wheat to.

As I have been reading about our past relations with Russia, I keep seeing where we have pulled their "cheatnuts out of the fire", before. In fact it seems we have pulled a lot of "chestnuts out of the fire", for friends and foes alike, and our friends have turned out to be not so friendly either. I hope maybe we will wake up some day to the facts of life and get little tougher. But if not that, lets get a little more for our money.

I cannot cite all of the figures, but I am sure you know them quite well. The figures I am referring to are: what it costs to maintain our defenses, also what it cost to support our so-called friends. If you add them all up, it would come to a pretty neat sum. Yet. There are leaders in this country jumping like a lot of fish out of water for a chance to help the Russians. Who by the way are the ones who said "We will bury you." They forgot to add that we will help them dig the hole.

The argument goes like this, for selling wheat to the Russians. "If we don't sell it to them some one else will." Well let me tell you something. The only ones in position to sell to them are our so-called friends. So I say, let them sell to the Russians. It will show who will sell us out for a better deal. As you have gathered by now I am against this deal. I am a disabled veteran and I add this only because I want you to know that our country had a little pride once.

Thank you.

BRIGHTON, MICH.,  
October 2, 1963.

Representative CHARLES CHAMBERLAIN,  
Lansing, Mich.

DEAR SIR: I am writing to you in regard to the sale of wheat to Russia.

My husband and I are against this sale of wheat to Russia or any other communistic country.

We pretend to fight communism, yet here we are in the act of feeding it.

I remember a few years ago we sold scrap iron to a country and how did it come back. This is the same thing. We will be nourishing it. I feel that President Kennedy has let the American people down by this approval of wheat being sent to Russia.

Thanking you for your kind attention to past correspondence, I am

Yours truly,

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U.S. POLICY AIMS IN LATIN  
AMERICA

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The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, the rush of recent events makes necessary some restatement of basic U.S. policy aims in Latin America. In this regard, I commend Assistant Secretary of State Martin for his forthright and realistic statement of last Saturday relating to what this country can and should do about government upheavals in the hemisphere.

There is no question but that the best interest of the United States lies in the existence of a democratic and economically stable Latin America. Thus, our purpose in the area is to create an atmosphere in which democracy and economic stability can flourish.

But as Assistant Secretary Martin rightly points out, democracy is "a living thing which must have time and soil and sunlight in which to grow."

"We must do all we can to create these favorable conditions," Mr. Martin says, "and we can do and have done much." However, he continues, "we cannot simply create the plant and give it to them; it must spring from seeds planted in an indigenous soil."

As chairman of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, I have often criticized past State Department attitudes and actions which I believe were not in the best interests of our country. However, Mr. Martin's incisive analysis of our Nation's responsibility and capability in dealing with Latin American coups and government upheavals deserves special praise, coming as it does when a confused clamor is heard to enforce democracy-by-gunboat in the Dominican Republic and Honduras.

We may hope that Mr. Martin's words are now to be followed by action supporting his thesis that we should not adversely judge the new regimes in these countries until additional evidence is in regarding their composition and intentions.

Confused indeed is the chorus that calls for immediate action, drastic action, even direct military action by this country to restore the Juan Bosch and Villeda Morales governments to power. Many of these voices are the same ones who so often in the past have been cautioning against any effective action directed against the Soviet satellite, Cuba. Where now are their arguments concerning the U.S. need to recognize the fact that it cannot enforce its will on the hemisphere? Where now the admonitions concerning the effect on world opinion if the United States intervenes in the domestic affairs of smaller countries? Where now the counsel of inaction and patience, the talk of "complexities" and the warnings against "oversimplifications" whenever steps are urged to meet the very real threat of Castro's Cuba to the hemisphere?

Gunboat diplomacy—is that not the very course which some now urge this country to pursue in the Dominican Republic and Honduras? But why, we may ask, do some of these same observers of the Latin American scene take an ambivalent position regarding undemocratic regimes of the left and the right? If these observers can be patient about Castro's Cuba, its undemocratic and totalitarian rule over the Cuban people, its role as a Soviet satellite increasing tensions throughout the hemisphere, and its service as a base for military and subversive operations against hemispheric security—why then impatiently urge the administration to call out the marines to intervene in the Dominican Republic and Honduras?

Surely these observers cannot seriously believe that the military juntas of the